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CIVIL PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE
W. Hamilton Bryson*
I. DISMISSALS AND NONSUITS
Rules 2:41 and 3:3(c) of the Rules of Virginia Supreme Court
("Rules of Court")2 require the dismissal of an action if service of
process is not accomplished within one year after the filing thereof
unless the plaintiff can show "due diligence" or good cause for the
delay. Since the plaintiff can get personal service on a defendant
who has absconded by means of the general long arm statute,4 it
will be a heavy burden in practice to show due diligence or good
cause or it will be a highly unusual situation. Recently, two issues
have arisen regarding these rules.
The first issue is whether the dismissal is with prejudice. It can
be argued that, since service of process can be had by the general
long arm statute, the delay of a year in effectuating service of pro-
cess itself shows the lack of a good faith effort by the plaintiff to
have the defendant served.5 If the plaintiff has not acted in good
faith, the case should be dismissed with prejudice. If the cause is
not dismissed forever, the plaintiff can refile on the same day as
the dismissal, and the statute of limitations period will be tolled as
of the first filing." This process can be repeated indefinitely to the
total frustration of the statutes of limitations and the beneficial
policies thereof.1
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond; author of Handbook On Virginia Civil Pro-
cedure (2d ed. 1989); editor of Virginia Circuit Court Opinions; B.A., 1963, Hampden-Syd-
ney College; LL.B., 1967, Harvard University; LL.M., 1968, University of Virginia; Ph.D.,
1972, Cambridge University.
1. VA. S. CT. R. 2:4.
2. VA. S. CT. R. 3:3(c).
3. Applied in Campbell v. Vaughan, 10 Va. Cir. 154 (1987); Rosenquist v. Rosenquist, 10
Va. Cir. 51 (1986); Lorcom House Condo. v. Wells, 3 Va. Cir. 226 (1984), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 237 Va. 247, 377 S.E.2d 381 (1989); Stark v. Johnstone, 2 Va. Cir. 476 (1979); Chris-
tian v. Hautz, 6 Va. Cir. 486 (1972); Clark v. Long, 3 Va. Cir. 422 (1971).
4. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-328:1, -329(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
5. If the plaintiff shows that he has been diligent and is in good faith, the case should not
be dismissed at all.
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(E)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
7. W. H. BRYSON, HANDBOOK ON VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE 99-100 (2d ed. 1989).
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The other position was held by Judge Robert K. Woltz in the
case of Campbell v. Vaughan." In this case, as the dismissal was
not on the merits, it was ordered to be not with prejudice. The
statutes also appear to call for a dismissal without prejudice. Sec-
tion 8.01-229(E)(1) of the Code of Virginia ("Code")9 states in part
that "if any action . .. is dismissed without determining the mer-
its . . . another action may be brought . . .,,"
However, if a dismissal under Rule 3:3(c)" or Rule 2:412 is con-
sidered to be quasi-penal, it could be with prejudice though not on
the merits. Rule 4:12(b)(2)(C)' 3 provides for such a result for the
failure to cooperate with discovery requests. 14 If the dismissal is
quasi-penal, then it would seem that the Rules of Court will not be
trumped by the statute. 5
The timely service of process has been held to be "jurisdictional"
and to be a requirement that cannot be deemed waived by a gen-
eral appearance on the part of the defendant.' 6 It is submitted that
this position goes too far. If the Rule allows the plaintiff to excuse
the failure to effectuate service, then it cannot be a matter of juris-
diction. If a general appearance cures the failure to serve process,"7
then it should cure late service also.
Although an action must be filed against an uninsured or under-
insured motorist within the period of the statute of limitation,
there is no requirement of service of process upon the uninsured
motorist carrier within any set time. "[A] plaintiff in a personal
injury case may not discover that the tortfeasor is uninsured or
underinsured (as in this case) until after the tortfeasor has been
served with process, which may occur at a time after the statute of
limitations has run."' s
8. 14 Va. Cir. 23 (1988). This opinion had not come to the author's attention until after
his handbook, see BRYSON, supra note 7, had gone to the press.
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(E)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
10. Id.; see also Strickland v. Simpkins, 221 Va. 730, 735, 273 S.E.2d 539, 541 (1981).
11. VA. S. CT. R. 2:4.
12. Id. at 3:3(c).
13. Id. at 4:12(b)(2)(C).
14. Cf. Nuchols v. Marshall, 2 Va. Cir. 454 (1977) (case does not cite Rule 4:12(b)(2)(C);
however, it does deal with an order to dismiss a case for failure to cooperate with discovery
requests as having res judicata effect).
15. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 5; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-3(D) (Repl. Vol. 1984).
16. Marshall v. McDaniel, 9 Va. Cir. 369, 378 (1974).
17. E.g., Nixon v. Rowland, 192 Va. 47, 63 S.E.2d 757 (1951).
18. Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Stephenson, 235 Va. 420, 423, 367 S.E.2d 722, 724 (1988).
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The second issue is whether a plaintiff who has not obtained ser-
vice of process on the defendant within one year of filing can take
a nonsuit after the year has passed. It has been ruled that unless
the court finds that the plaintiff has exercised due diligence and
still has failed to get service, no judgment can be entered in that or
any subsequent action based on that cause of action.19 This reason-
ing would solve the problem of the first issue if it did not raise
problems of its own.
In opposition to this position, it has been ruled that a plaintiff
has an absolute right to one nonsuit for each cause of action.20 The
essence of a nonsuit is the voluntary withdrawal of an action with-
out prejudice to future litigation of the cause of action. Moreover,
Rule 2:421 and Rule 3:322 speak of "the action," and after a nonsuit,
the plaintiff brings a new and different action though it is based on
the same cause of action. 23
A plaintiff may nonsuit an action before it is dismissed, and he
may recommence as permitted by section 8.01-229(E)(3) of the
Code.24 This can be done only once.25 However, when the action is
dismissed under Rule 2:426 or Rule 3:3,27 it should be dismissed
with prejudice in order to preserve the integrity of the statutes of
limitations.
The common law rule was that a nonsuit could be taken at any
time before the jury returned its verdict. The current statute al-
lows a nonsuit only before the jury retires to deliberate or a motion
to strike has been sustained or the case is submitted to the judge
for judgment.28 Thus, where a verdict has been set aside for errors
of law in the instructions, it is too late thereafter to take a non-
19. See English v. Otis Elevator Co., 16 Va. Cir. - (1989); Clark v. Murphy, 13 Va. Cir.
347 (1988) (nonsuit not allowed); Shepelak v. Pascuzzi, 13 Va. Cir. 285 (1988); Williams v.
Weakley, 14 Va. Cir. 70 (1988).
20. Nash v. Jewell, 227 Va. 230, 315 S.E.2d 825 (1984); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
380(B) (Repl. Vol. 1984).
21. VA. S. CT. R. 2:4.
22. Id. at 3:3.
23. See McElhone v. Gale, 14 Va. Cir. 268 (1989); Collier v. Kirkby, 14 Va. Cir. 303
(1989); Moore v. Boswell, 10 Va. Cir. 343 (1988).
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(E)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
25. Id. § 8.01-380 (RepI. Vol. 1984) (absolute right of the plaintiff); see Nash v. Jewell,
227 Va. 230, 315 S.E.2d 825 (1984); Collier v. Kirkby, 14 Va. Cir. 303 (1989).
26. VA. S. CT. R. 2:4.
27. Id. at 3:3.
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(A) (Repl. Vol. 1984).
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suit.29 In addition, a nonsuit comes too late when a case has al-
ready been dismissed for failure to serve process.30 Further, after
the trial judge has ruled that he will grant summary judgment, a
nonsuit comes too late even though the draft order has not yet
been submitted and entered.3
When a case has been submitted to the court for rulings on a
demurrer based on the failure to state a claim, a plea of the statute
of limitations, and a motion to dismiss the case, it has been sub-
mitted to the court for a decision on the merits and a nonsuit
thereafter comes too late.2 However, where both parties have
made their oral arguments upon a motion for summary judgment
and the judge gives leave to file written memoranda before a cer-
tain day, the case is not submitted to the judge for the purposes of
the nonsuit statute until all memoranda have been filed or the
time limit expires.33
Where a plaintiff files a second action for the same cause of ac-
tion in a different circuit court and then nonsuits the first, the sec-
ond action will be dismissed because it was the same cause of ac-
tion and not filed in the same forum as the first.3 4 Also, where a
second action is filed after the nonsuiting of an action that was
appealed from the general district court, the statutory jurisdic-
tional limitations on the district court govern the ad damnum of
the second action.3 5 Thus, the new action is seen to be a continua-
tion of the first action even though it was refiled and given a new
docket number and new process was served on the defendant. A
plaintiff is estopped by his original suit in the district court to
claim later that he was damaged more than $7,000.00."6
29. Moyer v. A. E. Prinkey & Son, Inc., 14 Va. Cir. 56 (1988).
30. Campbell v. Vaughan, 14 Va. Cir. 23 (1988).
31. Khanna v. Dominion Bank, 237 Va. 242, 377 S.E.2d 378 (1989).
32. Wells v. Lorcom House Condo. Council, 237 Va. 247, 377 S.E.2d 381 (1989).
33. City of Hopewell v. iogar, 237 Va. 264, 377 S.E.2d 385 (1989).
34. See Moore v. Gillis, 14 Va. Cir. 219 (1988) (construing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(A)
(Repl. Vol. 1984)).
35. See Waller v. Anthony, 16 Va. Cir. - (1989). But cf. White v. Southland Corp., 3 Va.
Cir. 97, 98 (1983) (where plaintiff takes nonsuit in general district court and refiles for dam-
ages in excess of statutory jurisdictional limits, he can refile in circuit court if he does so
within six months).
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-77 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
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II. FAULTY SERVICE OF PROCESS
There seems to be an increasing amount of attempted service of
process by improper methods. Process is being mailed to defend-
ants. While this may be permitted in federal practice,37 there is no
provision for service through the mail in Virginia practice, except
for service on the Secretary of the Commonwealth acting as a de-
fendant's statutory agent.38 Also, process is being served by em-
ployees of the plaintiff's attorney. This is in contravention of sec-
tion 8:01-293(2) of the Code,39 inasmuch as service is being
attempted by a person who is "interested in the subject matter in
controversy. '"40
It has been suggested that the curing statute4 repairs the im-
proper service of process, in that the writs of process were actually
received by the defendants. Even though the statute contains the
words "shall be sufficient," '42 it is the opinion of this writer that the
curing statute only applies to good faith efforts to serve process
according to the various statutory requirements. If there is no good
faith requirement in the curing statute, then this statute could be
used effectively to nullify all of the other sections of Chapter Eight
of the Code. It would frustrate the policy of fair notice as ex-
pressed by the General Assembly in the various statutes regulating
service of process.
It has been ruled that personal service of process upon a defend-
ant by a sheriff is void where the defendant was fraudulently lured
into Virginia for the purpose of effectuating service of process. 43 If
the curing statute does not operate in such a situation where all of
the statutory requirements have been met, it is suggested that a
fortiori it should not cure service of process where, through bad
faith, the statutory requirements have not been met. The curing
statute should not permit a fraud on the law, and a deliberate scof-
fing at the rules of service of process should result in invalid
jurisdiction.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-329(B) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
39. Id. § 8.01-293(2).
40. Id.
41. Id. § 8.01-288.
42. Id.
43. See Wheeler v. Flintoff, 156 Va. 923, 933, 159 S.E. 112, 115 (1931); Abel v. Smith, 151
Va. 568, 574-77, 144 S.E. 616, 618-19 (1928); Lines v. Lines, 3 Va. Cir. 111, 112 (1983).
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III. SANCTIONS UNDER SECTION 8.01-271.1 OF THE CODE
In 1987, the General Assembly enacted a statute which requires
attorneys and parties not represented by counsel to certify to the
court that all pleadings and motions are made in good faith and
not for any improper purpose.44 This statute, which follows Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,45 also requires the
judge, if he finds a violation, to impose appropriate sanctions in-
cluding reasonable attorneys' fees upon the offending lawyer or
party or both.4" This statute goes considerably beyond the Rules of
Court.47 It also goes beyond federal Rule 11, in that it expressly
includes oral motions. The statute applies in both district and cir-
cuit courts." In 1989, the General Assembly extended these sanc-
tions to the bad faith filing of attachments and memoranda of lis
pendens."
There has been much discussion recently, among the bench and
bar, as to the use of sanctions under section 8.01-271.1 of the
Code50 for improper pleading and practice.51 So far, such sanctions
have been imposed only rarely and with considerable caution in
Virginia state practice. Only a few formal judicial opinions have
been reported, though this section of the Code has been in force
for two years.
In Parr Excellence, Inc. v. Anderson,2 the court found that a
motion to disqualify opposing counsel was not well grounded in
fact, not warranted in law and was made for improper purposes.
The court then found "that the motion was interposed for the pur-
poses of delay, harassment, frustration and escalation of costs of
the opposition. ' 53 Sanctions were imposed upon the pro se
defendant.
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
47. VA. S. CT. R. 1:4(a).
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
49. Id. § 8.01-269.
50. Id. § 8.01-271.1.
51. See, e.g., R. Page, III, & S. Holleran, The Impact of Rule 11 and Its Virginia Counter-
part on Civil Litigation (Jan. 21, 1989) (The Virginia Bar Association-Civil Litigation
Committee); Richardson, Bench, Bar Slow to Utilize State's Version of Rule 11, 3 Va. Law.
Weekly 937, 940 (Apr. 17, 1989).
52. 14 Va. Cir. 10 (1987).
53. Id. at 14.
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In Dominion Leasing Corp. v. Thompson," sanctions were im-
posed for the filing of outrageous pleadings filed for the purposes
of vexation and harassment. The claim pleaded was clearly barred
by the doctrine of res judicata. The arguments supporting the
claim were characterized by the judge as "deceitful. '5 5 Further-
more, a federal court had already imposed sanctions under Rule
1156 against the same party for filing the same claim in that court.
In that the same claim dismissed in the federal court had also been
later dismissed by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia,
the Circuit Court of the City of Roanoke found sanctions to be
appropriate.57
R. Page and S. Holleran note that lawyers are beginning to seek
sanctions for abusive practices:
In Holding v. Duling, Law No. 2055-1 (Cir. Ct. City of Richmond,
Dec. 16, 1987), Judge Murphey, sitting by designation, imposed
sanctions against a pro se [plaintiff] for filing an action that was
frivolous and clearly designed to harass the defendants. In Stanley
v. Birkbeck, Law No. 12088-FB (Cir. Ct. City of Newport News, July
6, 1988), the Circuit Court imposed sanctions against the plaintiff
and the plaintiff's counsel for violating § 8.01-271.1 during discov-
ery. Judge Bateman imposed sanctions against the plaintiff and her
attorney for giving materially false information at the plaintiff's
deposition and in answers to interrogatories propounded by the de-
fendant. Pursuant to § 8.01-271.1, the defendant sought attorney's
fees and costs incurred in attempting to verify the plaintiff's interro-
gatory responses and in preparing the motion for sanctions. The de-
fendant also sought an order dismissing the case with prejudice.
While the court declined to dismiss the case, the court awarded
sanctions jointly and severally against the plaintiff and her attorney
in the amount of $1,627.00.58
Although many members of the bar have expressed sincere res-
ervations, fearing a deleterious effect of section 8.01-271.1 of the
Code59 on the collegiality of the practice of law in the state courts,
it is clear to this writer that such a remedy is occasionally needed.
The cases just mentioned demonstrate it most amply.
54. 15 Va. Cir. 446 (1989).
55. Id. at 447.
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
57. Dominion, 15 Va. Cir. at 447-48.
58. Page & Holleran, supra note 51, at 24-25.
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
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Who should pay for the bad faith use of the courts of justice? If
a plaintiff pleads a sham claim or the defendant files a frivolous
demurrer, counsel must prepare memoranda of points and authori-
ties and appear at a special hearing to argue the point. This will
involve considerable expense to all parties to the litigation. It has
been suggested that this is simply part of the normal operation of
the system of justice. It appears to this writer, however, that one is
not serving one's client if one acquiesces in the bad faith of the
opposite party or his counsel by passing on the cost of opposing
bad faith motions to one's own client. An attorney should either
not charge his client for opposing a bad faith motion or move the
court for compensatory sanctions under section 8.01-271.1 of the
Code."0
This will significantly reduce the cost of litigation. This will be
equally effective for plaintiffs and defendants. The reduction of
the expense of litigation is certainly good public policy in that it
increases accessibility to the courts.
The Virginia state courts have been cautious and conservative in
their use of financial sanctions, refusing them in cases of good faith
error. In Berger v Simsarian,61 the court refused to grant sanctions
for the bringing of a non-meritorious lawsuit because the pro se
plaintiff's medical or psychological condition made it inappropri-
ate. In Tullidge v. Augusta County Supervisors,62 the court held
that a private reprimand was an appropriate sanction for a sincere
but unreasonable lawsuit. (It is the opinion of this writer that, if
the pleading was sincere and in good faith, then no sanction is re-
quired by the statute. Otherwise this statute would always place
the costs of the prevailing party's counsel upon the losing party, as
is the English practice. This was not the intent of the legislature.)
These circuit court opinions, on the subject of sanctions, show
that the Virginia courts are applying a subjective test. They are
applying sanctions only in instances of gross bad faith. 3
60. Id.
61. 14 Va. Cir. 261 (1989).
62. 15 Va. Cir. 134 (1988).
63. See also Lee Conner Realty Corp. v. Lannon, 9 Va. Cir. 97 (1987), (which was decided
before the effective date of VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1).
518 [Vol. 23:511
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IV. SOME MISCELLANEOUS NEW STATUTES
Numerous minor amendments to Virginia statutes were enacted
recently by the General Assembly. This section, however, will note
only a few of the more significant legislative changes in the law
relating to civil practice and procedure.
The right to trial by jury is now provided for in actions under
the Virginia Tort Claims Act.6 4 This 1989 amendment to the code
reverses the opinions in Wenker v. Commonwealth,65 and Kitchen
v. Department of Highways.26
The venue requirements for suits for divorce or annulment of
marriage have been taken out of section 20-96 of the Code6 7 and
reenacted in section 8.01-261 as a new subsection 19.68 This did not
change the designation of which courts can hear such suits. The
purpose of the reenactment in a different section of the Code was
to have venue mandatory but not jurisdictional. Formerly, venue
was jurisdictional because divorce is purely a creation of statutory
law and was not part of the common law. Since the statute that
created the right also designated the forum in which the right is to
be decided, venue was jurisdictional.69 Now, incorrect venue can be
waived by the defendant voluntarily or through inaction, 70 and the
divorce decree will not be rendered a nullity thereby. In addition,
the general forum non conveniens statute7 1 now applies to these
types of cases.
In 1989, a new section 8.01-420.4 of the Code72 was enacted to
regulate the place of the taking of depositions. It reads as follows:
Depositions shall be taken in the county or city in which suit is
pending or in an adjacent county or city; except that depositions
may be taken at a place upon which the parties agree or at a place
that the court in such suit may, for good cause, designate.7 3
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.4 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
65. 13 Va. Cir. 294 (1988).
66. 9 Va. Cir. 220 (1987).
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-96 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
68. Id. § 8.01-261.
69. BRYSON, supra note 7, at 138-39.
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-258 (Repl. Vol. 1984); id. § 8.01-264 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
71. Id. § 8.01-265 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
72. Id. § 8.01-420.4 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
73. Id.
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The former practice was for the requesting party to designate in
the subpoena the place for the examination. As a matter of prac-
tice, the place chosen was most frequently the requesting party's
attorney's office or a place suggested by the deponent.
The federal rule on the same subject, 4 which was last substan-
tially amended in 1985, reads as follows:
A person to whom a subpoena for the taking of a deposition is di-
rected may be required to attend at any place within 100 miles from
the place where that person resides, is employed or transacts busi-
ness in person, or is served, or at such other convenient place as is
fixed by an order of court.75
These two provisions are opposite to each other in focus. The
Virginia statute looks to the venue in which the action is pending.
The choice of forum is made by the plaintiff to suit his own conve-
nience, but the choice is limited by the venue statutes, which are
designed to assure that the convenience of the defendant is reason-
ably respected. While the convenience of nonparty witnesses may
be served in the process, it is only a matter of coincidence. The
federal rule is focused on the convenience of the deponent. It is to
be noted that neither the Virginia statute nor the federal rule
draws a distinction between parties and nonparty deponents.
It appears to this writer that the Virginia statute is basically in-
considerate to nonparty deponents and operates for the general
benefit of plaintiffs and their attorneys, who selected the forum in
the first place. A nonparty witness can be subpoenaed to attend
and testify at the other end of the state. Although mileage and
tolls are reimbursable,76 the major expense, time lost from work, is
not. Hence, another opportunity to harass the other party's wit-
nesses has been codified by this new statute.
The effect of the new statute will be substantially mitigated by
the provisions allowing the parties to agree among themselves on a
place for taking the deposition that is convenient to the deponent.
The attorneys acting in good faith will balance the expense of their
going to the locality where the deponent resides or works against
the possible lack of cooperation of a disgruntled witness who has
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2).
75. Id.
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 14.1-190 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
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been forced to come to them. In cases of bad faith and lack of
professional courtesy, a party or a witness may get a court order
designating a more fair and convenient place for the taking of the
deposition."
77. See also VA. S. CT. R. 4:1(c) (protective orders).
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